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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY MARY ANN STEWART, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
WAYNE LLOYD STEWART, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
> Case No. 920369CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OP" APPELLEE 
KATHY MARY ANN STEWART 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether this court should affirm the trial court's decision based on 
defects in appellant's brief. 
Standard of Review: Because this question is initially considered in this 
court, no standard of review is applicable. 
Issue 2: Whether sanctions should be awarded to appellee based on the 
defects in appellant's brief. 
Standard of Review: As indicated above, no standard of review is applicable. 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in requiring appellant to provide 
notice of his intention to exercise visitation and in failing to provide for summer 
visitation. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 
(Utah 1985). 
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in determining the parties' incomes 
for purposes of computing child support. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 
393 (Utah 1985). 
Issue 5: Whether the trial court erred in dividing the marital property. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 
(Utah App. 1990). 
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1992) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or 
obligations, and parties. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, 
and other relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1953, as amended) provides, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
(5)(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of 
current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer 
statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current 
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year to 
provide verification of earnings over time and shall document income 
from nonearned sources according to the source. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine 
whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce. It was tried before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
on February 20,1992. Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce 
were entered on May 6,1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kathy and Wayne Stewart were married in 1982. During the marriage, two 
children were born: Stevie Anne, age 9, and Ashlee Autumn, age 5. (Trial 
transcript (hereinafter referred to as "Tr.") p. 21). Ms. Stewart was the primary 
caretaker of the children. (Tr. p. 8; Findings of Fact 115, R. at 81). Mr. Stewart 
lived part-time in Fairview, Sanpete County, where Ms. Stewart and the children 
resided, and part-time in another county. 
During the marriage, the parties acquired a variety of real and personal 
property: a farm, a house, a cafe, farm equipment and animals, stock in 
Pacificorp, a retirement fund, several vehicles, furniture, and other miscellaneous 
property. In entering its findings of fact herein and in awarding the property to 
the parties, the trial court assigned specific values to some of the items of property 
(e.g., Findings of Fact 1124) and did not assign values to others (e.g., Findings of 
Fact 1126, R. at 86). 
The court also made orders governing child support, alimony, payment of 
debts, and attorney's fees. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
L This court should affirm the trial court's decision because appellant's 
brief is defective in many respects. Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence, 
failed to support his arguments with citations to the record, and failed to present a 
cogent and supported legal argument. The brief should be stricken and sanctions 
should be imposed upon appellant. 
II. The trial court did not err in requiring advance notice of visitation and 
in failing to award extended summer visitation. The evidence supports the court's 
finding on this issue, and the court did not abuse its discretion. 
III. The trial court correctly determined the parties' incomes for purposes 
of computing child support. There was ample evidence in the record supporting 
the court's findings with respect to income. 
IV. The trial court did not err in dividing the marital property. This court 
will not disturb the trial court's division of property absent a finding of abuse of 
discretion. In this case, the trial court did not assign values to all of the items of 
marital property it awarded; however, its division is fair and equitable. Further, 
the trial court did not err in failing to sustain appellant's claim of separate 
property. Appellant presented confusing, conflicting, and contradictory evidence 
with respect to this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
BECAUSE OF THE MANY DEFECTS IN APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF. 
Regardless of how ripe or meritorious an appeal might be, an appellant 
shoulders the threshold burdens of marshaling the evidence, citing to the record, 
and presenting a cogent argument complete with legal analysis. See, Utah R. 
App. P. 24; Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 
247 (Utah App. 1992). Failure to comply with these conditions ends the appeal, 
and the court will uassume[s] the correctness of the trial court's judgment." State 
u. Day, 815 P.2d 1345,1351 (Utah App. 1991). In West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 n.l (Utah App. 1991), the court noted: "We remind 
counsel that it is our prerogative to affirm the lower court decision solely on the 
basis of failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure/' 
1. The Trial Court 's J u d g m e n t Should Be Affirmed Because of 
Appellant's Failure To Marshal the Evidence. 
A trial court's findings of fact enjoy a presumption of correctness and "will 
not be overturned unless . . . clearly erroneous." College Irr. Co. v. Logan R. & 
Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1989). To overcome this 
presumption, an appellant must "marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
findings of the trial court and . . . then demonstrate that even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the factual determination of the trial court, the evidence is 
insufficient to support its findings." IdA 
A challenge to a trial court's factual findings carries a "heavy burden"; when 
that burden is "not properly discharged, [the appellate court will] refuse to 
consider the merits of challenges to the findings and [will] accept the findings as 
valid." Mountain States Broadcasting, supra at 553. See also, College Irr. Co, 
supra at 1244 (failure to marshal is "in and of itself, dispositive of [the] challenges 
to the trial court's findings of fact.") 
After acknowledging an appellant's burden on appeal, the court in Doelle 
refused to disturb the trial court's findings because the appellant's brief presented 
"the conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to his position and largely 
ignorefd] the contrary evidence." Doelle, supra p. 4 at 1178. This court reached a 
similar result in Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
1 Accord, Doelle, supra p. 4; Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991); 
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah App. 1990); Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989), reh'g. 
denied. 
Marchant involved the appellant's claim to a prescriptive easement, which 
had been denied by the trial court. On appeal, the appellant failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the court's finding, arguing instead only that the finding was 
not supported by the evidence. Id. at 682. The court refused to consider such 
"conclusory arguments without citation to either the record or cases involving 
pivotal issues." Zd.2 Indeed, the "very purpose of. . . the 'marshaling' doctrine 
and [Rule 24(a)(7), requiring citations to the record], is to spare appellate courts 
[the] onerous burden" of reviewing the entire record themselves. Wright, supra 
p. 5, at 512, n. 2. 
A. Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings as to appellant's visitation rights. 
Mr. Stewart argues first that the trial court was unreasonable when it found 
that the defendant should be awarded the right of reasonable visitation upon 
forty-eight hours' advance notice to the plaintiff. (Brief of Appellant at 2-3). Mr. 
Stewart has completely failed, however, even to attempt a demonstration that the 
evidence as to visitation is insufficient to support the trial court's findings. Mr. 
Stewart opted instead to argue that "[t]here is no finding that [Mr. Stewart] has 
any problem with parenting skills or exhibits any traits that are prejudicial to the 
children." (7d.at2). 
This is precisely the wrong way to attack a trial court's findings of fact. Mr. 
Stewart's failure to marshal any evidence supporting the trial court's findings 
2 Marchant also observed that an appellant's duty to marshal the evidence is 
essentially two-fold: the appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting 
the finding and then demonstrate the insufficiency of that evidence. The 
appellant must also "marshal evidence which would support each element 
required to prove their claim of prescriptive easement." Id. at 682. The 
court's refusal to upset the trial court's findings was apparently based on the 
appellant's failure to accomplish either of these tasks. 
leaves nothing for this court to consider. Therefore, this court should affirm the 
trial court's ruling as to visitation. 
B. Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court 's findings as to the award of child support . 
Mr. Stewart next argues that the trial court's findings of fact with respect to 
its award of child support are "inaccurate" because of alleged errors in the 
determination of the incomes of both parties. (Brief of Appellant at 3-4). Again, 
Mr. Stewart has completely failed to marshal and then attack the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings. Mr. Stewart instead argues that "[t]here was 
considerable testimony by appellant" that his income was lower than the trial 
court's finding. Id. at 4. 
As in Doelle, Mr. Stewart in this case "presents the conflicting evidence in a 
light most favorable to his position and largely ignores the contrary evidence." 
Doelle, supra p. 4 at 1178. Mr. Stewart's failure to meet his burden of marshaling 
the evidence also disposes of his second argument, and the court should affirm the 
trial court's findings as to the child support award. 
C. Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court 's findings as to the division of the marital assets. 
After finally recognizing his duty to marshal the evidence,3 Mr. Stewart 
attacks the trial court's division of the marital assets by observing only that "[t]he 
parties submitted a great deal of evidence to determine the value of the marital 
property." (Brief of Appellant at 6). 
Mr. Stewart again has failed, however, to present any evidence supporting 
the court's findings. Indeed, his entire brief is merely an invitation for this court 
to do what Mr. Stewart has failed to do. The court should assume the correctness 
3 Mr. Stewart correctly cites Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991), 
as authority for his duty to marshal the evidence. (Brief of Appellant at 6). 
. 7 . 
of the trial court's findings and affirm its judgment as to the division of the 
marital assets. 
2. Appellant's Failure To Support any Arguments with Citations to 
the Record Constitutes a Separate Defect in his Brief. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and specifically Rule 24,4 constitute 
minimum standards against which every appellate brief is measured. See, Koulis, 
id. at 1184. An appellate brief must include the following: 
A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in 
the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references 
to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the 
r e c o r d . . . . 
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(7). 
Failure to comply with these standards is fatal. "If a party fails to make a 
concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the record where those 
facts are supported, the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below." 
Koulis, supra at 1184. See also, Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 
1987). Thus, this court "need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly 
cited to, or supported by, the record." Id. (quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat. Life 
Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142,144 (Utah 1978)). 
This court has "routinely refused to consider arguments which do not 
include a statement of the facts properly supported by citations to the record." 
Price, supra p.4 at 249. For example, in Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987), 
the court dismissed an appeal because the appellant failed to cite to the record to 
4 The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure replaced both sets of appellate rules 
for the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, effective April 1,1990. Rule 24, 
however, has remained the same and is thus subject to the same 
interpretation as its predecessor. See, e.g., Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. ofCal., 
746 P.2d 1182,1184 (Utah App. 1987). 
support his statement of facts. See also, State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 
1991) (court refused to reach an issue because the defendant failed to include a 
statement of facts in her brief). 
Mr. Stewart's brief in this case consists of the following statement of facts: 
The parties were married on August 7,1982 and had two children 
as issue from the marriage relationship. The marital property 
consisted of real and personal property, a farming operation and a 
restaurant. 
(Brief of Appellant at 1).5 
This vague, useless summary is hardly what was contemplated by rule 
24(a)(7). With the exception of one citation to some trial testimony, the rest of the 
brief is devoid of any useful references to the record. Having failed to cite those 
portions of the record necessary for this appeal, Mr. Stewart cannot now rely on 
this court to cull those facts from the record for him. 
3. Appellant's Failure To Present a Cogent and Supported Legal 
Argument Requires that this Court Assume the Correctness of 
the Trial Court's Judgment , 
Every appellate brief must include an argument containing "the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). Inadequate legal analysis is yet another basis for affirming a trial 
court's judgment. Price, supra p. 4 at 249 ("Utah courts have also declined to 
reach the merits of an issue on appeal due to inadequate legal analysis.") 
In Price, the appellant "listed several errors . . . , [but] neglected 'to 
establish any of these arguments in the record or by legal authority.'" Id. (quoting 
Day, supra p. 4 at 1351 (Utah App. 1991)). Similarly, in Garza, the court declined 
5 The statement of facts includes a second paragraph containing only a report 
of the trial date and the issues decided. This statement is more properly 
included in the rule 24(a)(7) statement of the case, not in a statement of facts. 
A 
to even reach issues where the appellant failed to cite to the record or invoke any 
legal authority.6 Garza, supra p. 9 at 939. 
This court was asked in Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1991) 
to reverse a lower court based upon a brief that failed to cite to the record, failed to 
invoke any legal authorities, and included "no analysis whatsoever." Id. at 73. 
Observing that a challenge to a trial court's findings begins with those same 
findings, the court refused to reach the issue the appellant raised but failed to 
argue. 
In this appeal, Mr. Stewart fails to assist the court with any substantive 
legal analysis of the standards used in deciding child visitation, child support, or 
asset division issues. Moreover, Mr. Stewart never addresses the substantive law 
regarding appellate review of those matters. Mr. Stewart relies only on 
perfunctory references to the Utah Code and a standardized visitation schedule. 
This presentation can hardly be characterized as legal argument or analysis 
within the meaning of rule 24. The court should, as is its right, ignore Mr. 
Stewart's contentions and assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
4. Appellant 's Failure To Provide a Statement of the Issues and the 
Standard of Appellate Review for Each Issue Allows the Court 
To Affirm the Trial Court's Judgment . 
Rule 24(a)(5) provides that an appellate brief must contain a "statement of 
the issues presented for review and the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority for each issue." The purpose of this requirement "is to focus 
6 Accord, English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-19 (Utah App. 
1991) (appellant's "assertive analysis" was not meaningful argument thus 
allowing court to assume correctness of trial court judgment); State v. Sterger, 
808 P,2d 122,125 n. 2 (Utah App. 1991), quoted in Price, supra p. 4 at 249-50 
n. 5 ("Because defendant fails to cite support or provide any meaningful 
analysis as to [arguments concerning a search of a vehicle], we decline to rule 
on them.") 
1 A 
the briefs, thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in the processing of 
appeals." Christensen, supra p. 10 at 73. Like the other essentials of rule 24, this 
element is a sine qua non of a complete brief, one that is capable of invoking this 
court's appellate powers. Id. (correctness of trial court's judgment assumed on 
failure to comply with rule 24(a)(5)); Price, supra p. 4 at 250. 
Mr. Stewart's brief in this matter sets forth one "issue" - whether the trial 
court erred in "determining visitation, child support, property division and 
alimony." (Brief of Appellant at 1). Mr. Stewart has obviously failed to set forth 
the standard of appellate review or to specifically identify his claims. This defect, 
like the others already discussed, allows this court to affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
II. BECAUSE OF APPELLANT'S COMPLETE FAILURE TO 
RAISE ANY ISSUES ON A P P E A L , THE COURT 
SHOULD STRIKE APPELLANTS BRIEF AND AWARD 
SANCTIONS TO APPELLEE. 
The mandates of rule 24 may not be ignored. This rule exists to be enforced 
and carry with it a ready punishment when disregarded: 
All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion 
or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer. 
UtahR.App.P.24(k). 
Rule 24 demands only a minimum effort to prepare a written appellate 
presentation. The numerous reported decisions interpreting rule 24 apply it 
faithfully and provide ample guidance for compliance, along with sure notice of 
the consequences for noncompliance. See, e.g., Koulis, supra p. 8 at 1184-85; Price, 
supra p. 4 at 248-50; Christensen, supra p. 10 at 72-73. 
There is no excuse for defects in Mr. Stewart's brief. His systematic failure 
to marshal evidence and to comply with the clear requirements of rule 24 make 
disposing of this appeal an easy task for the court. Ms. Stewart, however, has, as 
she must, prepared an opposing brief and a motion to strike, causing her 
substantial unnecessary expense. Under rule 24, Mr. Stewart's brief should be 
stricken and Ms. Stewart awarded her attorneys' fees incurred by reason of Mr. 
Stewart's disregard for that rule. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING 
ADVANCE NOTICE OF VISITATION. 
As Mr. Stewart notes in his brief, the trial court has broad discretion in 
establishing a visitation schedule. The court's visitation order will not be 
reversed unless the appellate court is convinced that there has been a clear abuse 
of discretion. Walker, supra p. 2 at 112, The court must give priority to the 
welfare of the children over the desires of either parent. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 
641 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, Mr. Stewart asserts that there was no evidence that he has any 
traits prejudicial to the children. In fact, however, the trial court found a history 
of alcohol and drugs. (Tr. p. 295). Further, since Mr. Stewart sometimes lives and 
works some distance from Fairview, it is entirely reasonable that he be required 
to give notice when he intends to exercise visitation. 
Mr* Stewart also argues that the trial court should have followed the 
standard visitation schedule for the Third District and should have ordered a 
longer period of continuous visitation during the summer months. He offers no 
authority for this proposition, nor does he explain why he did not request such 
visitation at trial. 
Accordingly, the trial court's visitation order should be affirmed. 
1 9 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING 
T H E P A R T I E S ' I N C O M E S F O R P U R P O S E S OF 
COMPUTING CHILD SUPPORT. 
Mr. Stewart argues that the trial court erred in finding that his income was 
$4,600 per month. However, this argument ignores the fact that Mr. Stewart's 
1991 W-2 from his employer, Pacificorp, showed income of $55,537.54, or $4,628 
per month. (Tr. p. 106). In addition, the trial court found that Mr. Stewart had 
income from his farm for purposes of computing child support pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-45-1 (1953, as amended). (Findings of Fact 11 7, R. at 82). 
Mr. Stewart argues that Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (1953, as amended) 
requires that the court consider historical income and that his historical income is 
less than $4,600 per month. This argument is simply wrong. The statute imposes 
no such requirement and indicates instead that current income should be 
determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(1) (1953, as amended). Historical 
income is used only to determine whether underemployment exists. In addition, 
the evidence as to historical income was unconvincing. (Tr. p. 149,1. 23; p. 150,11. 
3-4). 
This case was tried in February of 1992. It was entirely proper for the court 
to use Mr. Stewart's 1991 income in computing child support and to disregard 
speculation on defendant's part that his 1992 income might be less.7 
Apparently, Mr. Stewart believes that the court's finding as to Ms. Stewart's 
income is also incorrect. Since he offers no argument whatsoever in support of 
that position, however, it is impossible to make an intelligent response. 
7 Mr. Stewart cites to p. 147 of the transcript for testimony concerning his 
income; the testimony actually appears on pp. 149-51. 
Mr. Stewart devotes only one paragraph of his brief to the issue of alimony. 
Based on the disparity in the parties' incomes and the evidence as to need, the 
basis for alimony is obvious. The court's order as to alimony should be affirmed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIVIDING THE 
MARITAL PROPERTY. 
Mr. Stewart argues that the trial court erred in dividing the marital 
property because, as to those items to which the court assigned a value, the net 
value of the items awarded to Ms, Stewart exceeds the net value of the items 
awarded to him. There are several problems with Mr. Stewart's argument: 
(1) The court did not assign a value of $3,000 to the 1967 Mustang 
vehicle (Findings of Fact 1123, R. at 85); rather, there was no value assigned. 
Ms. Stewart testified that the value was $1,500. (Tr. p. 64). 
(2) The court did not assign any value to many items; thus, it is 
impossible to determine whether there was exact mathematical equality in 
the division. (E.g., Findings of Fact ffll 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29, 
R. at 85-86). In addition, appellant had dissipated cash savings of the parties 
(Tr. p. 66, 11. 14-25; p. 67, 11. 1-2) and had failed to make a payment that 
would have increased the equity in the farm. (Tr. p. 37,11. 10-25; p. 38,11. 1-
25; p. 39,11.1-25; p. 40,11.1-6). 
(3) The trial court is not required to make an exact 50/50 division of 
the property. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987). 
Mr. Stewart also argues that the court did not give him credit for "separate 
property." Mr. Stewart's evidence to the existence and amount of premarital 
property was vague, confusing, and contradictory. (Tr. p. 160,11. 19-25; p. 161,11. 
1-11; pe 165,11. 3-25; p. 166,11.1-20). 
As the court commented with respect to Mr. Stewart's claim of premarital 
property: "You see, you got me in a situation. They say you didn't have any, and 
you say, "We had $20,000.' And what am I supposed to do? Flip a coin and say, 
"Well, if it lands on its end, we'll say 10." (Tr. p. 161,11. 24-25; p. 162,11.1-3). 
Having failed to provide sufficient evidence to the court concerning his claim 
of premarital property, and having failed to produce any documentation to 
support his claims, it is naive for Mr. Stewart to now claim that the court should 
have found he is entitled to a return of certain premarital property. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to respond to Mr. Stewart's arguments because appellee cannot 
determine whether he is arguing that the trial court's findings of fact were 
inadequate, or that the evidence does not support the findings of fact. In either 
event, in order to challenge the court's findings of fact, "the defendant must 
marshal all of the evidence in favor of the findings and then demonstrate that 
even when reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court below, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." Reed, supra p. 5 at 1184. Mr. 
Stewart has clearly not accomplished this. 
Further, the rulings of the court challenged by Mr. Stewart are not 
inequitable. There was evidence from which the court could find that advance 
notice of visitation was appropriate. Mr. Stewart did not even request extended 
summer time visitation. Child support was based on evidence of Mr. Stewart's 
current income and a reasonable interpretation of Ms. Stewart's income. 
Likewise, there is ample evidence to support the award of alimony. Nor has Mr. 
Stewart demonstrated that the trial court's division of the parties' real and 
personal property is inequitable under the circumstances. 
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. Mr. Stewart 
should be ordered to pay Ms. Stewart's attorney's fees incurred in connection with 
this appeal based on his failure to conform to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure as set forth herein. 
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